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Abstract—The electric vehicle (EV) market has been growing
rapidly around the world. With large scale deployment of EVs in
power systems, both the grid and EV owners will benefit if the
flexible demand of EV charging is properly managed through the
electricity market. When EV charging demand is considerable
in a grid, it will impact spot prices in the electricity market
and consequently influence the charging scheduling itself. The
interaction between the spot prices and the EV demand needs
to be considered in the EV charging scheduling, otherwise it
will lead to a higher charging cost. A day-ahead EV charging
scheduling based on an aggregative game model is proposed in
this paper. The impacts of the EV demand on the electricity prices
are formulated with the game model in the scheduling considering
possible actions of other EVs. The existence and uniqueness of
the pure strategy Nash equilibrium are proved for the game. An
optimization method is developed to calculate the equilibrium of
the game model through quadratic programming. The optimal
scheduling of the individual EV controller considering the actions
of other EVs in the game is developed with the EV driving
pattern distribution. Case studies with the proposed game model
were carried out using real world driving data from the Danish
National Travel Surveys. The impacts of the EV driving patterns
and price forecasts on the EV demand with the proposed game
model were also analysed.
Index Terms—Aggregative game model, day-ahead market,
electric vehicles (EVs), game theory, Nash equilibrium.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices and Sets:
t, τ Index of time intervals.
T Set of time intervals for planning.
v, v′, v′′, i, φ Index of electric vehicles (EVs).
V Set of EVs in the game.
Φ Set of EVs with driving pattern realiza-
tions according to the driving pattern
distribution of set V .
δ Cardinality of set T .
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η Cardinality of set V .
B. Parameters:
dv,t, di,t, dφ,t EV driving energy consumption at time
t.
emaxv,t , e
max
i,t , e
max
φ,t Upper limit of state of charge (SOC)
level of the EV battery at time t.
eminv,t , e
min
i,t , e
min
φ,t Lower limit of SOC level of the EV
battery at time t.
einiv , e
ini
i , e
ini
φ Initial SOC level of the EV battery.
Ev, Ei, Eφ EV battery capacity.
pmaxv , p
max
i , p
max
φ Maximum EV charging power limit.
sv,t, si,t, sφ,t EV charging availability indicator at
time t.
λt Spot price of electricity at time t.
αt Forecast baseline price at time t.
βt Price sensitivity coefficient at time t.
∆t A time interval in the planning.
C. Variables:
sv, sv′ , sv′′ EV charging strategy in the game.
s∗v,x
∗
v EV charging strategy at the Nash equi-
librium of the game.
S−v Charging strategies of all the other
players except EV v in the game.
S∗ Nash equilibrium of the game.
xv,t, xv′,t, xv′′,t,
xi,t, xφ,t
EV charging energy at time t.
x∗v,t EV charging energy at time t at the
Nash equilibrium of the game.
ζ+v,t Dual variable for the constraint of SOC
level upper limit at time t in the plan-
ning of EV v.
ζ−v,t Dual variable for the constraint of SOC
level lower limit at time t in the plan-
ning of EV v.
ρv Dual variable for the daily charging en-
ergy balance constraint in the planning
of EV v.
ξv,t Dual variable for the constraint of
charging power upper limit at time t
in the planning of EV v.
ϕv,t Dual variable for the constraint of
charging power lower limit at time t
in the planning of EV v.
2D. Functions:
fv, Jv Payoff function of EV v in the game.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE global concerns of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissionfrom fossil fuels and energy supply security are growing.
Electric vehicles (EVs) can not only reduce the GHG emission
from the transportation sector but also utilize excessive electric
power from renewable energy sources (RESs) [1]. EVs are
a promising alternative of conventional internal combustion
engine (ICE) vehicles. Many national or regional plans and
projects have been carried out around the world in order to
promote the EV deployment [2], [3].
When the EV penetration level is high, the charging demand
will have great impacts on the grid [4], [5]. Without proper
management, the uncontrolled EV charging demand will in-
crease the peak load of the grid. It is because the majority
of EV charging is synchronized by daily driving patterns and
coincides with the peak hours of conventional demands. In
order to address the challenge of EV demand and further
utilize its flexibility, EV charging has to be integrated into the
electricity market. The topic has attracted a lot of attention.
The optimal EV charging scheduling in electricity markets has
been widely researched with different objectives. References
[6]–[9] formulated optimal EV charging strategies from dif-
ferent perspectives in the day-ahead market. The optimal EV
charging operation was investigated in [10]–[12] for both day-
ahead and real time scheduling. The optimal bidding of EVs in
the day-ahead energy market and the ancillary reserve market
was studied in [13], [14].
When the EV penetration level is high in the power system,
the EV charging demand will have a significant impact on
electricity spot prices and consequently influence the EV
charging strategies. The EV charging behaviour forms a non-
cooperative game in the day-ahead market. The possible
actions of other EVs in the market need to be considered when
the charging of an EV is scheduled. Otherwise, it will result in
a higher charging cost. The game theory is a powerful tool to
analyse the interactions between the participants in a market.
Game theory analyses have been studied for the market power
and electricity producer behaviour in different electricity mar-
kets [15]–[17]. The game theory has also been applied in the
studies of demand-side management [18], [19]. The market
effects of demand response aggregators in the game theory
framework have been studied in [20], [21], which consider
a general deferrable load model and the network constraints
are considered using linear approximation. The interaction
between EV demands has been investigated with the game
theory by a few studies. Reference [22] formulated the game of
EV charging management to describe the competition of time-
flexible EV load for future demand-side management (DSM).
A static non-cooperative game formulation was proposed in
[23] for distributed charging in EV networks to model the
interaction between several EVs which are connected to a
common residential distribution transformer. A decentralized
charging control for large populations of plug-in electric
vehicles (PEVs) was developed in [24]. It applied the principle
of Nash certainty equivalence for the overnight “valley-fill”
charging control by introducing a cost for tracking the average
charging strategy of all EVs. A distributed multi-agent EV
charging control method was proposed in [25] based on the
Nash certainty equivalence principle in order to consider the
network impacts of the transformer loading. A mean field
game formulation was introduced in [26] for the competition
of EV charging in a smart grid to analyse the EV demand. Ref-
erence [27] studied the price competition among EV charging
stations using a potential game. The work in [28] formulated
the charging problem of plug-in hybrid EVs in a potential
game framework to optimize the cost of the utility company
and payoff of the customers. A Stackelberg game was used in
[29] to analyse the energy exchange between a smart grid and
PEV groups.
Previous work mainly focuses on the interactions between
the EV charging and the charging stations, aggregators or the
system operators. The interaction between the EV demands
and its impact on the system prices have not been studied yet.
In this paper, an aggregative game model is proposed for the
day-ahead EV charging scheduling. The interaction between
the EV demand in the day-ahead market is formulated through
an aggregative game. The optimal charging plans of EVs in the
day-ahead market considering other EVs’ demand in a non-
cooperative game context can be obtained with the proposed
model. The contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• Propose a day-ahead EV charging scheduling based on
an aggregative game model considering the interaction
between the EV charging demand and its impacts on the
electricity spot prices;
• Prove the existence and uniqueness of the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the game model;
• Develop a method to calculate the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the aggregative game model and the opti-
mal charging scheduling of the individual EV controller
considering the actions of other EVs in the game using
the distribution of the EV driving patterns.
The paper is organized as follows. The mathematical model
of EV charging scheduling with the aggregative game is
presented in Section II. The existence and uniqueness of the
pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the aggregative game of
EVs are proved in Section III. In Section IV, the method
to calculate the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game is
described. In Section V, a case study of the proposed game is
presented and discussed, followed by conclusions.
II. DAY-AHEAD CHARGING SCHEDULING OF EVS
A. Day-ahead Energy Planning of EVs
In this paper, EV charging is assumed to be handled by EV
controllers (e.g. smart charging devices). The EV controllers
carry out day-ahead charging plans optimally with driving
pattern inputs from EV owners. They represent the benefit
of EV owners and are assumed to be economically rational.
Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) is not considered in this paper and
therefore the EV controllers are assumed to only place demand
bids in the day-ahead market. The demand of EV day-ahead
3energy plans can be put together by aggregators and forwarded
to the electricity wholesale market.
For the EV controllers, the day-ahead energy planning aims
to minimize the charging cost while meeting the EV driving
requirements. Thus, the day-ahead charging planning of an EV
can be formulated as the optimization below.
min
xv,t
∑
t∈T
λtxv,t (1)
Subject to
eminv,t 6
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ )/Ev + einiv 6 emaxv,t ∀t ∈ T
(ζ−v,t, ζ
+
v,t)
(2)
∑
t∈T
xv,t >
∑
t∈T
dv,t (ρv) (3)
xv,t 6 pmaxv sv,t∆t ∀t ∈ T (ξv,t) (4)
xv,t > 0 ∀t ∈ T (ϕv,t) (5)
where ζ+v,t, ζ
−
v,t, ρv, ξv,t, ϕv,t are the dual variables of the
corresponding constraints.
The objective of the planning is to minimize the charging
cost in (1) subject to the SOC limit constraint (2), the
daily energy balance constraint (3), the EV charging energy
limit constraint (4) and the charging energy non-negativity
constraint (5). For the SOC limit constraint (2), the EV SOC
level is calculated through the cumulated charging energy and
driving energy consumption. In each time interval, the SOC
level of the EV battery is within the specified range with the
charging plan. For the daily energy balance constraint (3), the
total driving energy consumption of the EV during the day
is covered by the total charging energy of the day. For the
charging energy limit constraint (4), the EV charging energy is
constrained by the maximum power limit and the EV charging
availability. The EV charging availability indicator sv,t shows
the status of the EV at time t. It equals to 1 when the EV is
parked and available for charging, and it equals to 0 when the
EV is not available for charging, e.g. when it is being driven
on the road.
B. Aggregative Game of EV Day-ahead Scheduling
As shown in (1), the EV energy planning needs to forecast
spot prices in the day-ahead market. When there is a con-
siderable number of EVs in the grid, their demand will be
comparable to the conventional demand and inevitably influ-
ence the spot prices in the day-ahead market. Generally, the
electricity spot price is a discontinuous function of demand. In
order to integrate the function in the optimization of the energy
planning, a price sensitivity based method has been proposed
and applied in [8], [9] to model the relation between prices
and demand. The predicted spot prices consist of a baseline
component due to the price-inelastic demand and a flexible
demand dependent part as illustrated in (6).
λt = αt + βt
(∑
v∈V
xv,t
)
(6)
where αt is the forecast baseline prices at time t in the day-
ahead market; βt is the price sensitivity coefficients; V is
the set of EVs in the day-ahead market. The approximation
of demand-price function as (6) offers acceptable accuracy
and efficiency to formulate the relation between the demand
and spot prices in the optimizations [8], [9], [30]. Although
prices in the real world market are not cleared according to
(6), the analysis in the paper holds as long as the relation
between prices and demand can be approximated by (6). The
study in [30] indicates that with the coefficients determined
with historical data through statistical learning processes, the
influence of the demand on the electricity prices can be
modelled in an affine form as (6).
Because the spot prices are demand dependent as illustrated
in (6), the energy plans of EVs form a non-cooperative game in
the day-ahead market. The strategies of EVs are the electrical
demand of their own energy plans as denoted below,
sv = {xv,t : t ∈ T } ∀v ∈ V (7)
while the strategies of all other players in the game are denoted
as follows,
S−v = {sv′ : v′ 6= v} ∀v ∈ V (8)
As players in the game, the EV controllers aim to maximize
their own payoff function. Thus, the payoff function of each
EV is the opposite of the objective function in their own
optimizations as (1). It can therefore be expressed as follows.
For ∀v ∈ V:
Jv(sv, S−v) = −
∑
t∈T
λtxv,t
= −
∑
t∈T
xv,t
[
αt + βt
∑
v′′∈V
xv′′,t
]
= fv(sv,
∑
v′′∈V
sv′′)
(9)
where Jv is the payoff function of EV v. For all of the EVs
in the game, the constraints of their own optimizations are
independent of each other as the constraints only rely on their
own driving requirements. In this case, the strategies of the
EVs are only coupled through the payoff functions. As shown
in (9), the payoff function of EV v can be expressed in a form
that only its own strategy and the aggregated strategies of all
the EVs in the game are involved, denoted by fv . Therefore,
the game by the energy plans of the EVs in the day-ahead
market is an aggregative game.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the constraints
in the optimization of each EV define a non-empty set, for the
cases that the driving requirements of the EVs are possible to
be fulfilled. As a result, the aggregative game of EVs has a
continuous non-empty strategy set.
III. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
OF THE GAME OF EVS
As presented in Section II, the energy planning of EVs
forms an aggregative game in the day-ahead market. The Nash
4equilibria of the game exist. Further, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium of the game, the energy
plan of each EV is a best response to the energy plans of all
other EVs. The interest of the Nash equilibrium lies in the fact
that all the EVs’ energy plans will not deviate from the state
when the equilibrium is reached. It is a stable action profile
for all the EVs. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium of the game of the EVs are proved in this section.
Proposition 1: Let matrix B ∈ Rm×n and vector c ∈ Rm
define a non-empty set Ω by Bx 6 c, d ∈ Rn is an arbitrary
constant vector. If symmetric matrix Q ∈ Rn×n is positive
definite, there exists a constant vector µ > 0, such that the
following equations in the variable x ∈ Rn have a solution,
and the solution x∗ is unique in the set Ω.
Qx+BTµ = d
(Bx− c)µT = 0 (10)
Proof: Construct a standard inequality constrained quadratic
programming problem as follows,
min
x
1
2
xTQx− dTx (11)
Subject to
Bx 6 c (12)
As the symmetric matrix Q in the quadratic term is posi-
tive definite and the feasible set is non-empty, the quadratic
programming problem defined by (11) and (12) has a unique
solution [31]. Let x∗ denote the optimal solution. Consider
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of the
quadratic programming problem, the following equations hold
at the minimizer x∗ ∈ Ω.
Qx∗ − d+BTµ = 0
(Bx∗ − c)µT = 0
Bx∗ 6 c
µ > 0
(13)
where µ is the vector of the dual variables of the inequality
constraints. Comparison of the first two lines of (13) and (10)
shows that x∗ is a solution of (10).
The uniqueness of the solution is proved as follows. Sup-
pose there exists a constant vector µ > 0 such that there is
a solution x′ ∈ Ω for (10). As x′ is a solution of (10) and
Bx′ 6 c, the KKT conditions of the quadratic programming
problem hold at x′. As the matrix Q is positive definite and all
the constraints are linear, the quadratic programming problem
is strictly convex and x′ is its optimal solution. Due to the fact
that the strictly convex quadratic programming problem has a
unique solution, x′ = x∗. Thus, the solution x∗ is unique in
the set Ω. So Proposition 1 is proved.
According to the game theory, a Nash equilibrium of the
aggregative game S∗ is defined by the strategies of all the
EVs in the game as follows,
S∗ = {s∗v : ∀v ∈ V} (14)
such that
Jv(s
∗
v, S−v) > Jv(sv, S−v) ∀v ∈ V (15)
At the equilibrium, each EV best responds to the others
energy plans. Therefore, its energy plan is the optimal solution
of the optimization as follows. For ∀v ∈ V
s∗v = x
∗
v =
{
x∗v,t : ∀t ∈ T
}
(16)
where
x∗v = argmin
xv,t
∑
t∈T
λtxv,t
= argmin
xv,t
∑
t∈T
xv,t
αt + βt
xv,t + ∑
v′∈V
v′ 6=v
xv′,t

 (17)
subject to constraints (2), (3), (4) and (5).
The KKT optimality conditions of the optimizations de-
scribed above can be summarized as follows. For ∀v ∈ V:
αt + 2βtxv,t + βt
∑
v′∈V
v′ 6=v
xv′,t +
∑
τ6t
(
ζ+v,τ − ζ−v,τ
)
+ ρv + ξv,t − ϕv,t = 0 ∀t ∈ T
(18)
ζ+v,t
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ ) + Ev(einiv − emaxv,t )
 = 0 ∀t ∈ T
(19)
ζ−v,t
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ ) + Ev(einiv − eminv,t )
 = 0 ∀t ∈ T
(20)
ρv
(∑
t∈T
xv,t −
∑
t∈T
dv,t
)
= 0 (21)
ξv,t (xv,t − pmaxv sv,t∆t) = 0 ∀t ∈ T (22)
ϕv,txv,t = 0 ∀t ∈ T (23)
ζ+v,t > 0 ⊥
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ ) +Ev(einiv − emaxv,t ) 6 0 ∀t ∈ T
(24)
ζ−v,t > 0 ⊥ −
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ−dv,τ )−Ev(einiv −eminv,t ) 6 0 ∀t ∈ T
(25)
ρv > 0 ⊥ −
∑
t∈T
(xv,t − dv,t) 6 0 (26)
ξv,t > 0 ⊥ xv,t − pmaxv sv,t∆t 6 0 ∀t ∈ T (27)
ϕv,t > 0 ⊥ −xv,t 6 0 ∀t ∈ T (28)
where (18) is the stationarity condition, (19)-(23) are the
complementary conditions, (24)-(28) are the primal and dual
feasibility conditions.
When all the equations (18)-(23) hold simultaneously, they
can be rearranged and expressed in the same form as (10)
where
x = [xv1,t1 · · ·xvη,t1 , xv1,t2 · · ·xvη,t2 , · · ·
xv1,tδ · · ·xvη,tδ ]T
5µ = [ζ+v1,t1 , ζ
−
v1,t1 , ξv1,t1 , ϕv1,t1 , · · · ,
ζ+vη,t1 , ζ
−
vη,t1 , ξvη,t1 , ϕvη,t1 ,
...
ζ+v1,tδ , ζ
−
v1,tδ
, ξv1,tδ , ϕv1,tδ , · · · ,
ζ+vη,tδ , ζ
−
vη,tδ
, ξvη,tδ , ϕvη,tδ ,
ρv1 , ρv2 , · · · , ρvη ]T
Q =
A . . .
A

︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ×A
, A =

2 1 · · · 1
1 2 · · · 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 · · · 2
 ∈ Rη×η
where δ and η are the cardinalities of the sets T and V ,
T = {t1, t2, · · · tδ}, V = {v1, v2, · · · vη}. The elements in
the matrix B, vectors c and d are determined in accordance
with the order of the elements in the vectors x and µ.
It can be proved easily that the symmetric matrix Q is
positive definite. The feasible set defined by the optimization
constraints of each EV is non-empty. Meanwhile, the con-
straints of each EV are independent with the constraints of
the other EVs. Thus, the constraints of all the EVs also define
a non-empty set. According to Proposition 1, there exists a
constant vector µ > 0, such that there is a solution x∗ for the
equations (18)-(23) in the feasible set, and the solution x∗ is
unique. Thus, there exists a unique minimizer x∗ such that all
the optimizations of the EVs reach its own optimal solution
simultaneously. As all the EVs act optimally in response to the
energy plans of the other EVs at x∗, it is a Nash equilibrium
of the game as defined in (14)-(17).
As such, the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium of the game of the EVs are proved.
IV. CALCULATING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE
GAME OF EVS
The Nash equilibrium of the game of EVs cannot be
calculated directly by their own optimizations because the
energy plans of EVs are coupled with each other through
the objective functions of their optimizations. In order to
calculate the Nash equilibrium of the game, a method through
quadratic programming is proposed and presented in detail in
this section.
The quadratic optimization model to calculate the Nash
equilibrium of the game is constructed as follows.
min
xv,t
∑
t∈T
∑
v∈V
(
αtxv,t +
1
2
βtx
2
v,t
)
+
∑
t∈T
1
2
βt
(∑
v∈V
xv,t
)2
(29)
Subject to
eminv,t 6
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ )/Ev + einiv 6 emaxv,t
∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V (ζ−v,t, ζ+v,t)
(30)
∑
t∈T
xv,t >
∑
∀t∈T
dv,t v ∈ V (ρv) (31)
xv,t 6 pmaxv sv,t∆t ∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V (ξv,t) (32)
xv,t > 0 ∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V (ϕv,t) (33)
The objective function of the proposed quadratic model
consists of three terms, a linear term of the charging cost
with the baseline prices, a quadratic term with the individual
charging demand of the EVs and a quadratic term with the
total charging demand of the EVs. Instead of minimizing the
EV’s own charging cost, the objective function is designed
so in order to take into account all the other’s EVs’ charging
demand. It can be proved that with such an objective function,
the solution of the quadratic problem is the same as the optimal
solution of each EV’s own optimization given the energy plans
of the other EVs in the game. The constraints of the quadratic
model for each EV are the same as the constraints in its own
optimization as (2)-(5). Thus, the solution of the problem is in
the feasible sets of the EVs’ own optimizations. As a result,
the solution of the proposed quadratic problem is the Nash
equilibrium of the aggregative EV game in the day-ahead
market.
The proof that the solution of the proposed quadratic
model is the same as the optimal solution of each EV’s own
optimization is described below. Consider the KKT optimality
conditions of the quadratic optimization model, they can be
summarized as follows.
αt + βtxv,t + βt
∑
v∈V
xv,t +
∑
τ6t
(
ζ+v,τ − ζ−v,τ
)
+ ρv + ξv,t − ϕv,t = 0 ∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V
(34)
ζ+v,t
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ ) + Ev(einiv − emaxv,t )
 = 0
∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V
(35)
ζ−v,t
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ ) + Ev(einiv − eminv,t )
 = 0
∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V
(36)
ρv
(∑
t∈T
xv,t −
∑
t∈T
dv,t
)
= 0 ∀v ∈ V (37)
ξv,t (xv,t − pmaxv sv,t∆t) = 0 ∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V (38)
ϕv,txv,t = 0 ∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V (39)
ζ+v,t > 0 ⊥
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ ) + Ev(einiv − emaxv,t ) 6 0
∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V
(40)
ζ−v,t > 0 ⊥ −
∑
τ6t
(xv,τ − dv,τ )− Ev(einiv − eminv,t ) 6 0
∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V
(41)
ρv > 0 ⊥ −
∑
t∈T
(xv,t − dv,t) 6 0 ∀v ∈ V (42)
ξv,t > 0 ⊥ xv,t − pmaxv sv,t∆t 6 0 ∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V (43)
ϕv,t > 0 ⊥ −xv,t 6 0 ∀t ∈ T ∀v ∈ V (44)
6where (34) is the stationarity condition, (35)-(39) are the
complementary conditions, (40)-(44) are the primal and dual
feasibility conditions.
By comparing the KKT conditions above and the KKT
conditions of the EVs’ optimization as (18)-(28), it can be
proved that the solution of the proposed quadratic problem
satisfies the KKT conditions of each EV’s optimization as
defined by (1)-(6) given all the other EVs’ energy plans as the
solution of the proposed quadratic problem. Thus, the solution
of the proposed quadratic problem is also the solution of the
EVs’ own optimizations when all the other EVs act the same as
the solution of the proposed quadratic problem. Consequently,
the solution of the proposed quadratic problem is the Nash
equilibrium of the aggregative game of the EVs in the day-
ahead market.
In practice, the individual EV controller cannot access the
driving patterns of the other EV users. However, the non-
cooperative game between the EV controllers is an aggregative
game as shown in Section II and III. The payoff of every
EV controller is only dependent on its own strategy and
the collective strategies of all the other controllers. In the
optimization of an EV controller, there is no need to distin-
guish between the demand of any other individual controllers.
Therefore, instead of knowing the driving pattern requirements
of every individual EV, an EV controller only need to know
the distribution of the driving patterns and its own EV driving
requirements. Let Φ be the set of realizations according to
the distribution of the EV driving patterns with a cardinality
of (η − 1), the optimization as (29)-(33) can be reformed as
follows for the individual EV controller i to determine its own
charging scheduling.
min
xi,t
∑
t∈T
(
αtxi,t +
1
2
βtx
2
i,t
)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
φ∈Φ
(
αtxφ,t +
1
2
βtx
2
φ,t
)
+
∑
t∈T
1
2
βt
xi,t + ∑
φ∈Φ
xφ,t
2
(45)
Subject to
emini,t 6
∑
τ6t
(xi,τ − di,τ )/Ei + einii 6 emaxi,t ∀t ∈ T (46)
∑
t∈T
xi,t >
∑
t∈T
di,t (47)
xi,t 6 pmaxi si,t∆t ∀t ∈ T (48)
xi,t > 0 ∀t ∈ T (49)
eminφ,t 6
∑
τ6t
(xφ,τ − dφ,τ )/Eφ + einiφ 6 emaxφ,t
∀t ∈ T ∀φ ∈ Φ
(50)
∑
t∈T
xφ,t >
∑
t∈T
dφ,t ∀φ ∈ Φ (51)
xφ,t 6 pmaxφ sφ,t∆t ∀t ∈ T ∀φ ∈ Φ (52)
xφ,t > 0 ∀t ∈ T ∀φ ∈ Φ (53)
where dφ,t and sφ,t are the stochastic parameters of the driving
pattern, which describe the driving energy consumption and
the charging availability of the driving pattern respectively.
In the optimization, xi,t are the decision variables for the
EV controller. On the other hand, xφ,t are the intermediate
variables which are determined in the optimization but not
existent in the charging plans of EV i.
V. CASE STUDIES
In order to demonstrate the behaviour of the EVs with the
proposed game model and the validity of the proposed method
for calculating the Nash equilibrium, case studies were carried
out with the Danish driving data. The details of the case studies
are described in this section.
A. Parameters in the Case Study
In the case study, a high EV penetration level is assumed.
The number of EVs in the case study is assumed to be 1.75
million, corresponding to about 80% EV penetration in the
private passenger vehicle sector of Denmark. It refers to a
scenario that each household which owns vehicles in Denmark
will own one EV [32].
The driving patterns of EVs in the case study are obtained
from the real driving data of the Danish National Travel
Surveys [33]. The driving patterns of the EVs are assigned
randomly with the distribution of the driving patterns in the
dataset of the surveys. The key parameters of EVs in the case
studies are as shown in Table I.
TABLE I
KEY PARAMETERS OF THE EVS
Parameter Value
EV Battery capacity 60kWh
Charging power limit 10kW
Energy consumption rate 150Wh/km
Lower SOC level limit 20%
Upper SOC level limit 85%
In order to calculate the Nash equilibrium, the baseline
prices with the conventional demand in the day-ahead market
need to be predicted in the proposed game model. The
historical data from the Nordic power market (Nord Pool) are
applied in the case study [34]. The predicted baseline prices
and the corresponding conventional demand in the case studies
are listed in Table II.
The optimization problems in the case study were solved
by CPLEX on a PC with Intel Core i7 CPU (2.90GHz) and
8GB RAM.
B. Case Study Results
As the base case, the uncontrolled EV charging was con-
ducted. The electrical demand is shown in Fig. 1. As shown in
the figure, the majority of the uncontrolled charging coincides
with the peak conventional demand which may further stress
the power system. The peak demand of the grid increases by
17% when the uncontrolled EV charging demand is applied
in the case study. In this case, the peak-to-average ratio of
7TABLE II
PREDICTED BASELINE PRICES AND CONVENTIONAL DEMAND
Hour Price
(e/MWh)
Demand
(MWh)
Hour Price
(e/MWh)
Demand
(MWh)
1 32.01 2824 13 41.06 4493
2 30.33 2692 14 39.52 4481
3 29.90 2644 15 39.09 4297
4 29.75 2654 16 38.80 4112
5 30.09 2712 17 38.06 4169
6 31.34 2975 18 39.88 4350
7 35.99 3489 19 42.99 4207
8 41.99 4086 20 43.60 3981
9 45.03 4412 21 41.99 3880
10 44.12 4518 22 40.57 3838
11 41.91 4618 23 37.89 3494
12 41.08 4595 24 33.01 3102
the total demand is 1.30. In order to illustrate the validity of
the proposed model, the EV day-ahead charging planning was
carried out with the optimization problem (45)-(53) for the
individual EV controllers. Fig. 2 shows the EV charging de-
mand with the proposed game model. When the EV charging is
scheduled according to the proposed game model in the day-
ahead market, the majority of the charging demand locates
in the low-demand period of the grid. It shows a “valley-
filling” pattern with the conventional demand of the grid. The
peak demand of the grid remains the same as the conventional
demand, and the peak-to-average ratio of the total demand is
only 1.11 in this case.
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Fig. 1. Electricity Demand with Uncontrolled EV Charging.
The expected spot prices in the day-ahead market with the
EV charging demand are shown in Fig. 3.
As shown in the figure, the spot prices are flat during the
hours when the charging demand is scheduled. Such a flat
pattern of the prices are formed by the EV demand because
the objective of the EV controllers’ plans is to minimize the
charging cost. The EV charging is not coordinated by anyone
in the non-cooperative game. The EV controllers act optimally
for the best of its own profit. However, their charging plans
take into account the possible actions of other EVs with the
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Fig. 2. Electricity Demand with Optimal EV Charging Based on the Game
Model.
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Fig. 3. Electricity Spot Prices with EV Demand in the Case Study.
game model. Instead of congregating the charging demand in a
short period, the charging plans spread the demand into a few
hours to prevent the spot prices in the period from shooting up
due to the EV demand. As a result, the expected spot prices
are flattened during the period. In the case study, the average
electricity price for the uncontrolled charging is 43.3e/MWh
while it is about 35.8e/MWh for the optimal charging with
the game model in the case. There is a about 20% drop in
the energy cost for the charging demand with the game model
on average. Thus there is a good economical incentive for
the EV owners to schedule their charging demand in the day-
ahead market taking into account other EV owners’ strategies.
Further, the total cost of the electricity consumption in the
first case is about 4.1 million Euros while it reduces to 3.9
million Euros in the second case. The integration of optimal
EV charging in the day-ahead market not only benefits the EV
owners but also reduces the total energy cost of the grid.
The EVs’ own optimizations as (1)-(5) with all the other
EVs charging plans known in advance and the optimization
8problem as (29)-(33) were also carried out. Both results are
identical to the game model solution solved by the optimiza-
tion problem as (45)-(53). Thus, the solution of the proposed
method provides the best response for the EVs to all the other
EVs’ actions. In other words, the solution gives the Nash
equilibrium of the proposed game.
C. Impacts of EV Driving Patterns
The case study in previous section has shown that the
proposed method gives the Nash Equilibrium of the game.
The solution of the optimization problem as (45)-(53) provides
the the best response for the EV controllers to all the other
EVs’ actions in the day-ahead market using the distribution
of the EV driving patterns. When the sample space is large
enough, the distribution of the EV driving patterns is generally
considered stable. However, it is still a real concern for the
randomness of the EV driving patterns in practice. A case
study has been carried out to illustrate the performance of
the proposed method when the distribution of the EV driving
patterns used in calculation deviates from the actual case.
In the study, a driving pattern distribution different from
the actual case is applied in the optimization of the EV
controllers as (45)-(53). The driving requirements of the EVs
are overestimated by the deviant driving pattern distribution
used in the case. Fig. 4 shows the mean value of the cumulative
driving distance of the EVs in the case study. The deviant
distribution used in the optimization of the EVs has an average
daily driving distance about 27% higher than the actual case.
The daily driving distance is 46km on average for the deviant
distribution while it is only 36km for the actual case. Further,
the daily driving distance also starts to cumulate earlier than
the actual case, which means earlier driving needs and less
charging availability for EVs.
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Fig. 4. Mean Value of the Cumulative Driving Distance.
The EV charging demand with the proposed method using
the deviant distribution in the case study is shown in Fig. 5.
Due to the intense driving needs of the deviant distribution,
the EV controllers overestimate the charging demand in the
first five hours in the optimization. As a result, the demand
in the period is reduced and this part of demand is shifted to
the sixth and seventh hours. Nevertheless, the amount of the
demand reduced in the first five hours is moderate in order
to prevent the spot prices in the sixth and seventh hours from
rising dramatically. The corresponding electricity prices in the
case are shown in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 5. Electricity Demand with EV Charging with Deviant Distribution.
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Fig. 6. Electricity Spot Prices with Deviant Distribution.
The spot prices in the sixth and seventh hours are higher
than the original case shown in Fig. 3 due to the increased
demand, especially in the sixth hour. Meanwhile, the spot
prices in the first five hour are slightly lower than the original
case. Accordingly, the average electricity price for EV charg-
ing with the deviant distribution in the case is 36.0e/MWh.
Despite of a large deviation of the driving pattern distribution
from the actual case, the EV charging planning with the
proposed method still stays close to the Nash equilibrium of
the non-cooperative game and the average charging price is
only slightly higher than the original case when the driving
pattern distribution used by the EV controllers well represents
the actual case.
9D. Impacts of Baseline Price Forecast
In the proposed game model, the EV controllers need to
estimate the baseline prices in the day-ahead market when
carrying out the charging scheduling. In order to estimate the
impact of the price forecast accuracy on the EV demand with
the proposed game model, two scenarios with forecast errors
have been defined.
In the first scenario, a case with a common error in an
identical hour in the price forecast for the EV controllers is
assumed. Specifically, all the EV controllers underestimate the
baseline price in the third hour by 10% during their charging
planning in this case. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the electrical
demand and the expected spot prices with the EV charging
respectively.
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Fig. 7. Electricity Demand with EV Charging in Scenario 1.
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Fig. 8. Electricity Spot Prices in Scenario 1.
As shown in Fig. 7, the EV controllers increase the charging
demand in the third hour and reduce the share of the other
charging periods. Consequently, the spot price in the third
hour increases obviously as shown in Fig. 8. Meanwhile, the
prices in the other charging periods are slightly lower than
the prices in the original case shown in Fig. 3. Due to the
underestimation of the baseline price in the third hour in the
forecast, all the EV controllers overrate the capacity for the
EV charging of the period in the game model. In such a
case, the third hour shows to be a better chance to charge
the EVs and the EV controllers distribute more demand in
the period than the original case with perfect price forecast.
As a result, there is a rise of the spot price in this hour due
to the increased EV charging demand. However, instead of
locating all or a large proportion of the demand in the third
hour, the EV controllers only shift a small part of the demand
to the period. It is due to the fact that the possible increased
demand in the period from other EVs are considered by the EV
controllers with the proposed game model. Therefore, the EV
controllers only move a small part of the demand from other
periods to the third hour and a steep peak price in the third
hour is avoided. In this case, the average electricity price for
the EV charging is about 36.1e/MWh. The energy cost for the
charging demand is only slightly higher than the original case
with perfect forecast. The consideration of other EVs’ actions
with the proposed game model prevents the EV controllers
from locating excessive demand in the wrong time due to the
forecast error defined in the scenario.
In the second scenario, a case with a uniform random error
in all the hours in the price forecast for the EV controllers is
assumed. In this case, a random error uniformly distributed in
the range of ±10% is applied on the baseline price forecast
in each hour for all the EV controllers respectively. Fig. 9
and Fig. 10 show the electrical demand and the expected spot
prices with the EV charging in this case respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Time (Hour)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
 D
em
an
d 
(M
W
h)
Conventional Demand
EV Charging Demand
Fig. 9. Electricity Demand with EV Charging in Scenario 2.
As shown in Fig. 9, due to the forecast error, the EV
charging demand deviates slightly from the original case in
Fig. 2. Correspondingly, the spot prices with the EV charging
fluctuate slightly during the charging hours as shown in Fig.
10. For each EV controller, the scheduled charging plan is
different from the original case due to the forecast error.
However, as illustrated in the result of previous scenario, the
differences of the charging plans from the original case are
limited with the proposed game model. Further, the charging
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Fig. 10. Electricity Spot Prices in Scenario 2.
demand of the EVs compensates for each other in the hours
with the uniformly distributed errors in the baseline price
forecast in the scenario. Thus, the collective demand of all the
EVs shown in Fig. 9 is more or less the same as the original
case. As a result, the energy cost of the charging demand is
also the same as the original case with perfect price forecast.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the EV charging behaviour in the electricity
market is analysed with the game theory. An aggregative game
model is proposed for the day-ahead EV charging scheduling
in order to consider the interaction between EVs and its impact
on the electricity prices. The existence and the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium of the EV charging game are proved.
Further, an optimization method is proposed to calculate the
Nash equilibrium of the game. The optimal scheduling of the
individual EV controller considering the other EVs’ actions
and their impacts on the spot prices in the day-ahead market
is developed according to the Nash equilibrium of the game.
The calculation result of the Nash equilibrium is the same
as the optimal planning when the EV controller knows the
actions of all the other EV controllers in advance. Therefore,
the proposed method gives the best response of the EV
controllers considering the actions of other EVs. Further, the
proposed scheduling method for the individual EV controllers
also provides the same solution as the Nash equilibrium of
the game. Thus, the EV charging planning with the proposed
method finds the best solution for the EV’s own interest
while considering other EVs’ demand in the day-ahead market.
Without any coordination or communication between the EV
controllers, the EV controllers distribute their own charging
demand with proper amount over a few hours so that the
demand will not congregate at a short period. In this way,
the high spot prices in the market and high charging cost are
prevented. From the system point of view, the EV charging
demand with the proposed method reduces the total energy
cost of the grid. It seeks the low demand period and prevents a
higher peak-to-average ratio of the total demand in the system.
The case study results show that the proposed method is robust
to the randomness of the EV driving patterns. In spite of large
deviation between the driving pattern distribution used in the
case study and the actual case, the solution of the proposed
method still stays close to the Nash equilibrium of the game.
The average cost for EV charging only increases slightly due
to the deviant distribution. Moreover, the case study results
also show that the proposed method is robust to price forecast
errors. Both common and random forecast errors of baseline
prices across the EV controllers result in a charging cost only
slightly higher than the original case with perfect forecast.
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